Uptime Report Research · Technique Matrix

Ransomware Initial Access Vectors: What 25 CISA #StopRansomware Advisories Show

Ransomware initial access vectors are documented in an unusual public record: the #StopRansomware joint advisories that CISA, the FBI, and partner agencies publish on individual ransomware groups. We read all 25 of them and coded the MITRE ATT&CK techniques each one lists under Initial Access. Exploits against internet-facing systems lead, and phishing is close behind.

Advisories reviewed25
With initial access techniques22
Public-facing app exploit73%
Phishing59%
Two or more entry routes77%

How do ransomware groups get in?

Across the 22 advisories that publish an initial access technique list, five techniques account for nearly every entry. Shares are the percentage of those 22 advisories that list each technique; one advisory can list several.

Exploit public-facing application T1190

16 of 22

Phishing T1566

13 of 22

External remote services T1133

12 of 22

Valid accounts T1078

10 of 22

Drive-by compromise T1189

2 of 22

Most groups have more than one door. 17 of 22 advisories (77%) list two or more of these techniques. A defense that closes only one route, such as email filtering for phishing, leaves the others open.

The matrix: every advisory, every technique

Each row is one #StopRansomware advisory, newest first. A filled dot means CISA lists the technique under Initial Access for that group. Advisory IDs link to the original on cisa.gov.

Advisory T1190Exploit public-facing application73% T1566Phishing59% T1133External remote services55% T1078Valid accounts45% T1189Drive-by compromise9%
AA26-222AGunra Ransomware2026-08-10
AA25-203AInterlock2025-07-22
AA25-071AMedusa Ransomware2025-03-12
AA25-050AGhost (Cring) Ransomware2025-02-19
AA24-242ARansomHub Ransomware2024-08-29
AA24-131ABlack Basta2024-05-10
AA24-109AAkira Ransomware2024-04-18
AA24-060APhobos Ransomware2024-02-29
AA23-353AALPHV Blackcat2023-12-19 No initial access table published
AA23-352APlay Ransomware2023-12-18
AA23-325ALockBit 3.0 (Citrix Bleed)2023-11-21 No initial access table published
AA23-319ARhysida Ransomware2023-11-15
AA23-284AAvosLocker2023-10-11
AA23-263ASnatch Ransomware2023-09-20
AA23-158ACL0P (MOVEit, CVE-2023-34362)2023-06-07
AA23-136ABianLian Ransomware Group2023-05-16
AA23-075ALockBit 3.02023-03-16
AA23-061ABlacksuit (Royal) Ransomware2023-03-02
AA23-040ADPRK-funded ransomware (Maui, H0lyGh0st)2023-02-09 No initial access table published
AA22-335ACuba Ransomware2022-12-01
AA22-321AHive Ransomware2022-11-17
AA22-294ADaixin Team2022-10-21
AA22-249AVice Society2022-09-06
AA22-223AZeppelin Ransomware2022-08-11
AA22-181AMedusaLocker2022-06-30

Percentages in the header use the 22 advisories with an initial access technique list as the base. 3 advisories do not publish one.

Edge devices are the common thread

In 20 of 22 advisories (91%), initial access included either an exploit of a public-facing application (T1190) or abuse of an external remote service such as a VPN or RDP gateway (T1133). Since January 2025, 3 of the 4 new advisories with an initial access list name T1190. Several advisories are built around a single product flaw: CL0P’s MOVEit campaign (CVE-2023-34362) and LockBit 3.0 affiliates exploiting Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966).

Valid accounts (T1078) appear in 10 advisories. Of those, 7 also list external remote services, the pattern of a stolen or purchased login used on an exposed VPN or remote desktop gateway.

What this means for MSPs and MSSPs

For a managed provider, the matrix is a patching and exposure priority list. Internet-facing appliances, file transfer servers, and remote access gateways belong at the top of the vulnerability queue, ahead of internal endpoints. Phishing still appears in 59% of advisories, so email security and user reporting remain necessary, but they cover less than two thirds of the entry routes documented here.

Frequently asked questions

What is the most common ransomware initial access vector?

Exploitation of public-facing applications (MITRE ATT&CK T1190). It appears in the initial access section of 16 of the 22 CISA #StopRansomware advisories that list initial access techniques (73%).

How often is phishing the way ransomware gets in?

Phishing (T1566) is listed in 13 of 22 advisories (59%). It is the second most common technique, but most advisories list more than one entry route.

Do ransomware groups use stolen credentials?

Valid accounts (T1078) appear in 10 of 22 advisories (45%), and external remote services such as VPN and RDP (T1133) in 12 (55%). The two often work together: a stolen or bought login is used on an exposed remote access service.

How many #StopRansomware advisories has CISA published?

We counted 25 unique #StopRansomware advisories from 2022-06-30 (MedusaLocker) to 2026-08-10 (Gunra Ransomware), as listed on cisa.gov in October 2026.

What should an MSP patch first to reduce ransomware risk?

The data points at internet-facing systems. In 20 of 22 advisories (91%), initial access included either a public-facing application exploit or an external remote service. That makes VPNs, firewalls, file transfer tools, and remote access gateways the first place to look, alongside MFA on every remote login.

Download the data. cisa-stopransomware-initial-access.csv (CSV). Licensed under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to The Uptime Report.

Methodology

Source. All advisories published under CISA’s #StopRansomware program, collected from cisa.gov in October 2026. One duplicate URL for the Vice Society advisory was removed, leaving 25 unique advisories from 2022-06-30 to 2026-08-10.

Coding. For each advisory we extracted the MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs listed in its Initial Access tactic table. We recorded techniques exactly as CISA lists them. T1021, T1059 also appear in Initial Access tables but are outside the five shown. Three advisories (AA23-040A, AA23-325A, AA23-353A) do not include an Initial Access technique table and are excluded from percentages.

Limitations. Advisories describe what investigators observed for a group at the time of writing, not a statistical sample of all ransomware incidents. Some advisories were updated after release; we used the current version. A technique’s absence means CISA did not list it, not that the group never uses it.

Not advice. This is a summary of public government advisories, not a security assessment of any environment.

Cite as:The Uptime Report. "Ransomware Initial Access Vectors: What 25 CISA #StopRansomware Advisories Show." October 2026. https://theuptimereport.com/ransomware-initial-access-vectors/

References

  1. CISA, #StopRansomware official alerts and statements. Accessed October 2026.
  2. MITRE ATT&CK, Initial Access (TA0001). Accessed October 2026.
  3. CISA, AA26-222A: #StopRansomware: Gunra Ransomware. Accessed October 2026.

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Comments

10 responses to “Ransomware Initial Access Vectors: What 25 CISA #StopRansomware Advisories Show”

  1. […] Ransomware Initial Access VectorsCISA advisories coded by entry technique […]

  2. […] Ransomware Initial Access VectorsCISA advisories coded by entry technique […]

  3. […] gateway filters out the bulk of malicious and spam messages before they reach a user. But some phishing is designed to slip past filters, which is why user awareness is the second layer. The strongest […]

  4. […] Among cyberattacks, ransomware was the most common type (592), followed by malware (224) and phishing […]

  5. […] Ransomware Initial Access VectorsCISA advisories coded by entry technique […]

  6. […] Ransomware Initial Access VectorsCISA advisories coded by entry technique […]

  7. […] 10 also listed external remote services such as VPN or remote desktop, according to our analysis of ransomware initial access vectors. The other main route, exploiting internet-facing devices, is tracked in our analysis of the CISA […]

  8. […] CISA and its partners have published #StopRansomware advisories for only three of these ten groups under their current names. None of the top two has one. The advisories that do exist are still useful for defense: we coded every one by the way attackers got in, in our analysis of ransomware initial access vectors. […]

  9. […] Post dates also trail attack dates, by an amount these data cannot measure: RansomLook records when a post appeared, not when the intrusion happened. Official counts are smaller still because they rely on victims coming forward. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center logged 3,611 ransomware complaints in 2025, up from 3,156 in 2024, a trend we track in our five-year analysis of ransomware reported to the FBI. IC3 also identified 63 new ransomware variants in 2025. CISA and the FBI publish #StopRansomware advisories on individual groups; we coded every one by entry technique in our report on ransomware initial access vectors. […]

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