Uptime Report Research · Measured scan · November 11, 2026

Government Email Security: Only 40% of City and County .gov Domains Block Spoofed Mail; Federal Is at 88%

Government email security looks very different outside Washington. As of November 11, 2026, we checked public DNS for all 15,485 live city, county, state, tribal and federal .gov domains in CISA’s registry: only 39.6% of the 10,736 city and county domains that receive email enforce DMARC, the setting that stops impostors sending mail in their name. Federal: 87.7%.

Key findings

  1. 39.6% of city and county .gov domains that receive email (4,255 of 10,736) tell receiving servers to quarantine or reject mail that fails authentication. Federal domains, where executive-branch agencies have been bound by CISA’s Binding Operational Directive 18-01 since October 2017, are at 87.7%.
  2. 14.9% of local mail domains use the strictest policy, p=reject, against 83.5% of federal mail domains.
  3. 6,481 city and county mail domains have no enforcing policy: 33.6% of local mail domains publish no valid DMARC record and 26.8% publish p=none, which only monitors.
  4. State and territory government domains are about level with the local rate: 42.3% of 697 state mail domains enforce DMARC.
  5. DNSSEC shows the widest gap: 84.5% of federal .gov domains are signed, against 6.6% of city and county domains.
  6. Among states with at least 20 local mail domains, enforcement is highest in Florida (61%), Idaho (58%), Oregon (52%) and lowest in Michigan (26%), Alaska (26%), Mississippi (27%).
  7. 2,066 of 3,144 US counties have a county .gov domain in use that we could match; 32.8% of Americans live in a county where every such domain enforces DMARC.

Federal vs local: where the funnel narrows

Federal vs local .gov email domains, from receiving mail to rejecting spoofed mailFederal (587 mail domains)City and county (10,736 mail domains)Federal: Receive email (MX record), 587 of 587 (100.0%)City and county: Receive email (MX record), 10,736 of 10,736 (100.0%)100%100%Receive email (MX record)Federal: Publish a DMARC record, 548 of 587 (93.4%)City and county: Publish a DMARC record, 7,133 of 10,736 (66.4%)93%66%Publish a DMARC recordFederal: Enforce: quarantine or reject, 515 of 587 (87.7%)City and county: Enforce: quarantine or reject, 4,255 of 10,736 (39.6%)88%40%Enforce: quarantine or rejectFederal: Reject outright (p=reject), 490 of 587 (83.5%)City and county: Reject outright (p=reject), 1,597 of 10,736 (14.9%)83%15%Reject outright (p=reject)
88%federal .gov mail domains enforcing DMARC (515 of 587)
40%city and county .gov mail domains enforcing (4,255 of 10,736)
6,481local mail domains with no enforcing policy

Each bar is a share of domains that receive email (have an MX record). Hover for counts. Scan of November 11, 2026.

The gap is 27 points at the first step and widens to 48 points at enforcement. 93% of federal and 66% of city and county mail domains publish some DMARC record, but a record set to p=none changes nothing for the recipient. Federal agencies were ordered by BOD 18-01 to reach p=reject on every second-level domain by October 2018 and to send aggregate reports to CISA; 457 of 587 federal mail domains still list CISA’s reporting address. No such order covers cities and counties, and 15% of their mail domains reach p=reject.

Government email security by state

0% to 19%20% to 29%30% to 39%40% to 49%50% to 59%60%+* fewer than 20 mail domains

Local .gov DMARC enforcement by stateAlaska: 26% of 34 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCAK26%Alabama: 36% of 180 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCAL36%Arkansas: 37% of 356 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCAR37%Arizona: 41% of 97 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCAZ41%California: 46% of 439 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCCA46%Colorado: 45% of 128 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCCO45%Connecticut: 44% of 151 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCCT44%District of Columbia: 0% of 0 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCDCn/a*Delaware: 29% of 14 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCDE29%*Florida: 61% of 357 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCFL61%Georgia: 36% of 296 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCGA36%Hawaii: 67% of 6 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCHI67%*Iowa: 47% of 135 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCIA47%Idaho: 58% of 62 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCID58%Illinois: 42% of 324 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCIL42%Indiana: 28% of 114 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCIN28%Kansas: 38% of 156 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCKS38%Kentucky: 28% of 196 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCKY28%Louisiana: 37% of 76 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCLA37%Massachusetts: 42% of 300 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMA42%Maryland: 33% of 93 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMD33%Maine: 38% of 115 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCME38%Michigan: 26% of 525 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMI26%Minnesota: 38% of 433 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMN38%Missouri: 38% of 298 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMO38%Mississippi: 27% of 112 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMS27%Montana: 39% of 85 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCMT39%North Carolina: 41% of 274 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNC41%North Dakota: 33% of 27 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCND33%Nebraska: 46% of 125 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNE46%New Hampshire: 51% of 194 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNH51%New Jersey: 33% of 206 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNJ33%New Mexico: 41% of 74 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNM41%Nevada: 37% of 27 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNV37%New York: 39% of 1,078 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCNY39%Ohio: 38% of 496 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCOH38%Oklahoma: 39% of 201 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCOK39%Oregon: 52% of 155 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCOR52%Pennsylvania: 29% of 310 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCPA29%Rhode Island: 43% of 44 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCRI43%South Carolina: 29% of 102 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCSC29%South Dakota: 44% of 43 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCSD44%Tennessee: 31% of 254 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCTN31%Texas: 48% of 530 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCTX48%Utah: 39% of 223 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCUT39%Virginia: 42% of 168 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCVA42%Vermont: 37% of 78 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCVT37%Washington: 42% of 170 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCWA42%Wisconsin: 44% of 717 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCWI44%West Virginia: 29% of 99 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCWV29%Wyoming: 43% of 54 city and county .gov mail domains enforce DMARCWY43%

Share of City and County .gov domains that receive email and publish DMARC p=quarantine or p=reject, by state. Hover a tile for the count.

Among the 48 states with at least 20 local mail domains, the enforcement rate runs from 26% in Michigan to 61% in Florida. The table gives every state and DC, with the counts behind each percentage so a reader can see how many domains a figure rests on.

State Local .gov domains Receive mail DMARC record Enforcing p=reject Reports (rua) SPF -all DNSSEC State agency domains enforcing
Alabama 209 180 54% 36% 7% 36% 57% 9% 43% of 23
Alaska 35 34 50% 26% 15% 38% 65% 14% 25% of 4
Arizona 114 97 72% 41% 19% 61% 45% 6% 29% of 83
Arkansas 388 356 63% 37% 12% 44% 60% 14% 42% of 26
California 560 439 72% 46% 20% 60% 62% 7% 0% of 4
Colorado 171 128 77% 45% 20% 55% 55% 14% 29% of 24
Connecticut 166 151 68% 44% 12% 50% 55% 5% 50% of 4
Delaware 19 14 79% 29% 0% 50% 64% 0% 33% of 3
District of Columbia 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8% of 13
Florida 409 357 78% 61% 31% 62% 64% 11% 66% of 64
Georgia 334 296 65% 36% 16% 51% 60% 7% 22% of 9
Hawaii 9 6 83% 67% 33% 83% 50% 0% 50% of 2
Idaho 79 62 81% 58% 21% 63% 68% 8% 43% of 7
Illinois 396 324 69% 42% 13% 52% 52% 6% 62% of 16
Indiana 128 114 60% 28% 9% 46% 65% 5% 50% of 4
Iowa 158 135 74% 47% 16% 58% 69% 8% 40% of 10
Kansas 181 156 59% 38% 21% 41% 71% 11% 24% of 21
Kentucky 216 196 55% 28% 9% 33% 58% 2% 25% of 4
Louisiana 94 76 57% 37% 18% 39% 62% 10% 40% of 10
Maine 129 115 81% 38% 11% 52% 44% 4% 50% of 2
Maryland 108 93 67% 33% 13% 42% 65% 5% 47% of 15
Massachusetts 323 300 72% 42% 15% 54% 58% 4% 27% of 15
Michigan 589 525 62% 26% 9% 35% 48% 5% 67% of 12
Minnesota 581 433 70% 38% 11% 38% 58% 6% 71% of 7
Mississippi 126 112 44% 27% 9% 30% 65% 3% 0% of 1
Missouri 334 298 64% 38% 10% 47% 63% 6% 0% of 2
Montana 99 85 55% 39% 15% 44% 72% 4% 30% of 10
Nebraska 139 125 65% 46% 17% 34% 76% 4% 71% of 7
Nevada 32 27 78% 37% 22% 67% 56% 16% 80% of 5
New Hampshire 202 194 76% 51% 21% 37% 74% 4% 0% of 2
New Jersey 240 206 66% 33% 13% 47% 61% 5% 60% of 30
New Mexico 79 74 73% 41% 15% 59% 66% 5% 36% of 11
New York 1,305 1,078 64% 39% 15% 41% 60% 4% 44% of 9
North Carolina 305 274 73% 41% 19% 56% 62% 8% 71% of 35
North Dakota 43 27 70% 33% 19% 56% 63% 7% 0% of 7
Ohio 587 496 68% 38% 14% 49% 56% 10% 76% of 29
Oklahoma 213 201 68% 39% 8% 57% 63% 23% 30% of 10
Oregon 176 155 75% 52% 20% 57% 68% 6% 44% of 9
Pennsylvania 345 310 60% 29% 11% 34% 62% 3% 30% of 10
Rhode Island 49 44 66% 43% 18% 50% 70% 6% 25% of 8
South Carolina 120 102 57% 29% 12% 45% 61% 1% 41% of 17
South Dakota 51 43 74% 44% 9% 65% 79% 10% 33% of 3
Tennessee 282 254 61% 31% 13% 42% 57% 5% 25% of 12
Texas 644 530 70% 48% 18% 56% 69% 6% 37% of 19
Utah 249 223 63% 39% 15% 48% 51% 4% 67% of 6
Vermont 90 78 68% 37% 12% 42% 74% 4% 20% of 5
Virginia 211 168 72% 42% 23% 52% 66% 9% 33% of 6
Washington 193 170 76% 42% 16% 58% 65% 7% 0% of 2
West Virginia 115 99 59% 29% 12% 33% 69% 3% 48% of 21
Wisconsin 778 717 63% 44% 14% 48% 64% 5% 23% of 13
Wyoming 56 54 61% 43% 17% 59% 52% 11% 0% of 11

Local means City and County domains in CISA’s registry with live DNS. DMARC, enforcement, p=reject, reports and SPF are shares of the domains that receive mail; DNSSEC is a share of all live local domains. The last column covers State or territory domains that receive mail. Click a header to sort. States with fewer than 20 local mail domains: DC, DE, HI; read their percentages with care.

Seven controls by type of government

Seven controls by government typeDMARC recordEnforcingp=rejectSends DMARCreportsSPF hardfail (-all)DNSSEC signedSecurity contactlistedFederal1,295 live, 587 mailFederal: DMARC record 548 of 587 (93.4%)93%Federal: Enforcing 515 of 587 (87.7%)88%Federal: p=reject 490 of 587 (83.5%)83%Federal: Sends DMARC reports 525 of 587 (89.4%)89%Federal: SPF hard fail (-all) 412 of 587 (70.2%)70%Federal: DNSSEC signed 1,094 of 1,295 (84.5%)84%Federal: Security contact listed 1,169 of 1,295 (90.3%)90%State1,444 live, 697 mailState: DMARC record 496 of 697 (71.2%)71%State: Enforcing 295 of 697 (42.3%)42%State: p=reject 156 of 697 (22.4%)22%State: Sends DMARC reports 415 of 697 (59.5%)60%State: SPF hard fail (-all) 315 of 697 (45.2%)45%State: DNSSEC signed 205 of 1,444 (14.2%)14%State: Security contact listed 1,050 of 1,444 (72.7%)73%County3,019 live, 2,507 mailCounty: DMARC record 1,811 of 2,507 (72.2%)72%County: Enforcing 1,153 of 2,507 (46.0%)46%County: p=reject 485 of 2,507 (19.3%)19%County: Sends DMARC reports 1,425 of 2,507 (56.8%)57%County: SPF hard fail (-all) 1,558 of 2,507 (62.1%)62%County: DNSSEC signed 277 of 3,019 (9.2%)9%County: Security contact listed 1,978 of 3,019 (65.5%)66%City9,445 live, 8,229 mailCity: DMARC record 5,322 of 8,229 (64.7%)65%City: Enforcing 3,102 of 8,229 (37.7%)38%City: p=reject 1,112 of 8,229 (13.5%)14%City: Sends DMARC reports 3,640 of 8,229 (44.2%)44%City: SPF hard fail (-all) 4,982 of 8,229 (60.5%)61%City: DNSSEC signed 540 of 9,445 (5.7%)6%City: Security contact listed 5,064 of 9,445 (53.6%)54%Tribal282 live, 253 mailTribal: DMARC record 180 of 253 (71.1%)71%Tribal: Enforcing 109 of 253 (43.1%)43%Tribal: p=reject 50 of 253 (19.8%)20%Tribal: Sends DMARC reports 150 of 253 (59.3%)59%Tribal: SPF hard fail (-all) 158 of 253 (62.5%)62%Tribal: DNSSEC signed 9 of 282 (3.2%)3%Tribal: Security contact listed 184 of 282 (65.2%)65%

DMARC, enforcement, p=reject, reports and SPF are shares of mail domains; DNSSEC and security contact are shares of all live domains in each group. Security contact means the registry lists a public security email for the domain.

Government type Live domains Receive mail DMARC record Enforcing p=reject Reports (rua) SPF -all DNSSEC Enforcing, all live domains
Federal 1,295 587 93.4% 87.7% 83.5% 89.4% 70.2% 84.5% 85.2%
State or territory 1,444 697 71.2% 42.3% 22.4% 59.5% 45.2% 14.2% 24.0%
County 3,019 2,507 72.2% 46.0% 19.3% 56.8% 62.1% 9.2% 40.7%
City 9,445 8,229 64.7% 37.7% 13.5% 44.2% 60.5% 5.7% 35.0%
Tribal 282 253 71.1% 43.1% 19.8% 59.3% 62.5% 3.2% 40.4%
City and county combined 12,464 10,736 66.4% 39.6% 14.9% 47.2% 60.9% 6.6% 36.4%

Federal domains fall under two rules that local ones do not. BOD 18-01 covers DMARC and SPF, and OMB memo M-08-23 (August 22, 2008) told agencies to sign all their .gov domains with DNSSEC by December 2009. That shows in the DNSSEC column: 84% of federal domains are signed, against 14% of state and 7% of city and county domains. SPF is closer: 70% of federal and 61% of local mail domains end their SPF record in a hard fail (-all).

Does the mail provider matter?

Enforcing (quarantine or reject)Any DMARC record

DMARC by mail provider, city and county .gov domainsMicrosoft 3655,718 domainsMicrosoft 365: DMARC record on 64.3%Microsoft 365: enforcing DMARC on 40.8%41% / 64%Gateway in front of Microsoft 3651,800 domainsGateway in front of Microsoft 365: DMARC record on 80.6%Gateway in front of Microsoft 365: enforcing DMARC on 48.9%49% / 81%Google Workspace995 domainsGoogle Workspace: DMARC record on 57.3%Google Workspace: enforcing DMARC on 30.7%31% / 57%Other host or provider821 domainsOther host or provider: DMARC record on 59.2%Other host or provider: enforcing DMARC on 30.7%31% / 59%Gateway, other or unknown backend772 domainsGateway, other or unknown backend: DMARC record on 76.0%Gateway, other or unknown backend: enforcing DMARC on 44.9%45% / 76%Own or government-run server630 domainsOwn or government-run server: DMARC record on 57.3%Own or government-run server: enforcing DMARC on 22.2%22% / 57%

City and County .gov domains that receive mail, grouped by the provider in the lowest-preference MX record. A gateway is a filtering service (for example Proofpoint, Mimecast or Barracuda) in front of a mailbox platform; Microsoft 365 behind a gateway is inferred from SPF includes.

Microsoft 365 runs mail for 70% of local .gov mail domains when gateways in front of it are counted, and Google Workspace for 9%. Microsoft 365 domains enforce DMARC at 41%, Google Workspace at 31% and self-hosted or government-run mail servers at 22%. The Microsoft 365 market share census found the same Microsoft lead across all .gov domains. The provider does not set the policy; the domain owner, or the IT contractor who manages its DNS, does.

How many residents are covered: a county view

County .gov mail domains all enforce DMARCSome enforceNone enforceNo county .gov domain in use

US population by county .gov DMARC statusCounty .gov mail domains all enforce DMARC: 112.1 million residents (32.8%), 798 counties33%Some enforce: 51.0 million residents (14.9%), 183 counties15%None enforce: 108.8 million residents (31.8%), 1,085 counties32%No county .gov domain in use: 70.0 million residents (20.5%), 1,078 counties20%

Each of the 3,144 counties and county equivalents in the Census Bureau’s Vintage 2025 estimates, weighted by population and grouped by the DMARC status of the County .gov domains we could match to it.

We matched 2,978 of 3,064 County-type .gov domains to 2,066 of the 3,144 Census counties and county equivalents (66%). The other 1,078 counties, home to 20.5% of residents, have no live county .gov domain we could match (another 86 County-type domains could not be tied to a single county); they use .us, .org, .com or .net addresses, or none. 32.8% of US residents live in a county where every county .gov domain that receives mail enforces DMARC, 14.9% where some do and 31.8% where none do.

County population (2025) Counties With a county .gov domain Their mail domains DMARC record Enforcing DNSSEC
1,000,000+ 50 43 (86%) 88 82% 55% 9%
250,000 to 999,999 244 198 (81%) 304 82% 61% 10%
50,000 to 249,999 720 547 (76%) 653 79% 51% 11%
10,000 to 49,999 1,393 900 (65%) 1,009 69% 42% 9%
Under 10,000 737 378 (51%) 385 61% 37% 5%

The smallest counties lag: 43 of the 50 counties with a million or more residents have a county .gov domain in use, and 55% of their mail domains enforce DMARC; among counties under 10,000 people it is 378 of 737 and 37%.

This measures .gov only. Many towns, counties and school districts still send mail from .us, .org, .com or .net domains, which the CISA registry does not list. Some states are pushing them to .gov: California’s Government Code section 50034 requires cities and counties to use .gov or .ca.gov for public websites and employee email by January 1, 2029. The numbers here describe only the governments that have already moved to .gov.

Check your own domain

Type any domain to see what a receiving mail server sees. The lookup runs in your browser against Google Public DNS; nothing is stored.

Or from a terminal (macOS, Linux):

dig +short TXT _dmarc.yourtown.govdig +short TXT yourtown.gov | grep spf1dig +short DS yourtown.gov

On Windows: nslookup -type=TXT _dmarc.yourtown.gov Look for p=reject or p=quarantine plus a rua= address. Domains that never send mail should publish v=DMARC1; p=reject; and an SPF record of v=spf1 -all.

What this means for MSPs and government IT teams

  1. Start with reporting, then enforce. Publish p=none with a rua= address, read two to four weeks of aggregate reports to find every service that sends as the domain (utility billing, permit portals, agenda software, newsletters), fix SPF and DKIM for each, then move to quarantine and reject. 47% of local mail domains request reports today, against 89% of federal ones.
  2. Lock down domains that never send mail. Parked, vanity and election-information domains should carry v=spf1 -all and p=reject. That is what BOD 18-01 requires of federal second-level domains, and it takes two DNS records.
  3. Treat SPF as a supporting control. 61% of local mail domains use a hard fail; SPF alone does not protect the visible From address, which is why DMARC alignment matters.
  4. Sign the zone. With 7% of local .gov domains signed, DNSSEC is the largest gap against federal practice. Most managed DNS hosts can sign a zone and publish the DS record through the .gov registrar.
  5. List a security contact. 56% of local .gov domains list a public security email in the registry, against 90% of federal domains. get.gov asks every domain to add one.

Spoofed government email is a fraud tool: our phishing statistics report tracks the losses, and the DMARC adoption statistics scan shows the same gap between large and small private organizations.

Frequently asked questions

Can .gov emails be spoofed?

Yes, unless the domain enforces DMARC. A sender can put any address in the From line; DMARC lets the domain owner tell receiving servers to quarantine or reject mail that fails SPF and DKIM checks. In our November 11, 2026 scan, 60% of city and county .gov mail domains (6,481) had no enforcing policy, against 12% of federal mail domains.

Is DMARC mandatory for government?

For federal executive agencies, yes: BOD 18-01 (October 16, 2017) required p=reject on all second-level domains within one year. No federal rule requires it for cities, counties or states; the .gov registrar (get.gov) recommends it. 88% of federal and 40% of city and county mail domains enforce it today.

What percentage of government domains use DMARC?

Counting any DMARC record, 93.4% of federal, 71.2% of state, 72.2% of county, 64.7% of city and 71.1% of tribal .gov mail domains publish one. Enforcement (quarantine or reject) is lower: 87.7%, 42.3%, 46.0%, 37.7% and 43.1%.

Why is p=none not enough?

p=none asks receivers to report failures but deliver the mail anyway, so spoofed messages still reach inboxes. 26.8% of local .gov mail domains stop at p=none. CISA’s BOD 18-01 guidance calls it a temporary setting on the way to quarantine or reject.

Does using Microsoft 365 or Google make a government domain safer?

Not by itself. Among city and county mail domains, 41% of those on Microsoft 365 and 31% of those on Google Workspace enforce DMARC; 22% of self-hosted ones do. DMARC is a DNS record the government sets, not a feature the provider switches on.

What does DMARC stand for?

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance, defined in RFC 7489. It is a TXT record at _dmarc. that states a policy (none, quarantine or reject) and where to send reports.

Download the data. government-email-security-dmarc-by-state-2026.csv (CSV). Licensed under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to The Uptime Report.

Free to cite and republish with a link. The CSV holds aggregates by government type, state, mail provider and county size. It does not list individual domains, and this report names no government that lacks DMARC.

Methodology

Domains. CISA’s .gov registry file current-full.csv (github.com/cisagov/dotgov-data, CC0), retrieved November 11, 2026: 15,786 domains of type City, County, State or territory, Tribal and Federal (Executive, Legislative, Judicial). Special district, school district and interstate domains were not scanned. A domain counts as live if it has name servers or an MX record; 299 were not live or could not be resolved and are excluded, leaving 15,485.

Lookups. Between November 11 and November 11, 2026 (UTC) we queried MX, the apex TXT record (SPF), the TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> and the DS record at the parent zone through Google Public DNS over HTTPS, at most 5 queries at a time, with failed lookups repeated through Quad9. Where the validating resolver returned SERVFAIL, one checking-disabled query read the records anyway (a DNSSEC validation failure). These are passive, public lookups only: no mail was sent, and no server was probed or contacted directly.

Definitions. Receives mail: at least one MX host that is not null. DMARC record: exactly one valid v=DMARC1 record with p=none, quarantine or reject; two or more records count as invalid. Enforcing: p=quarantine or p=reject (any pct value; 141 local mail domains use pct below 100). SPF hard fail: a single SPF record ending in -all. DNSSEC signed: a DS record exists in .gov for the domain. Provider: the lowest-preference MX host, matched to known suffixes; filtering gateways are attributed to Microsoft 365 or Google only when the SPF record or its includes name that platform.

Counties. County-type domains were matched to Census counties by the county name in the registry’s organization field, then by a unique county name inside the domain name, within the same state. Towns, townships and boroughs filed under County were left unmatched. Populations are Vintage 2025 July 1 estimates.

Limitations. DNS records can change daily. Domain counts are not government counts: one city can hold several .gov domains, and most local governments do not use .gov. DMARC enforcement shows the published policy, not whether every receiver applies it. Not advice.

Cite as:The Uptime Report. "Government Email Security: Only 40% of City and County .gov Domains Block Spoofed Mail; Federal Is at 88%." November 2026. https://theuptimereport.com/government-email-security-dmarc-by-state/

References

  1. CISA, dotgov-data: current-full.csv. Accessed November 2026.
  2. CISA, Binding Operational Directive 18-01: Enhance Email and Web Security. Accessed November 2026.
  3. OMB Memorandum M-08-23, Securing the Federal Government’s Domain Name System Infrastructure (PDF). Accessed November 2026.
  4. get.gov, Domain security best practices. Accessed November 2026.
  5. US Census Bureau, County Population Totals, Vintage 2025 (co-est2025-alldata.csv). Accessed November 2026.
  6. California Government Code section 50034. Accessed November 2026.
  7. RFC 7489, Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). Accessed November 2026.
  8. Google Public DNS, JSON API for DNS over HTTPS. Accessed November 2026.

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Comments

2 responses to “Government Email Security: Only 40% of City and County .gov Domains Block Spoofed Mail; Federal Is at 88%”

  1. […] Government Email Security 2026.gov DMARC: local 40% vs federal 88% […]

  2. […] Government Email Security 2026.gov DMARC: local 40% vs federal 88% […]

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